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uncertainty and confusion in that a finder is defined merely as the
one "who first takes possession." This leaves the old familiar prob-
lem of interpreting the term possession. The- Court of Appeals in
the Rofrano case impliedly construed possession as requiring a
reduction to physical control 38 and so rejected the constructive posses-
sion doctrine.
One of the main purposes of the New York statute seems to be
to promote the return of lost property by encouraging possible action
by finders.3 9 Indeed, protection of the owner's interest has always
been the purported purpose of the courts in dealing with cases in this
area.40 Bearing this in mind, it is suggested that this would be defeated
if the term "possession" was construed to require only a constructive
control.
It is doubtful if the Second Circuit in the principal case correctly
evaluated the precedents in saying that case law dictated a de-
cision for the tenant. However, its decision is consistent with the
purpose of the New York personal property statute. An award of the
disputed property to the landlord on the basis of technical prior
possession would result in a severe and undue limitation upon the
statute's effectiveness. Certainly the temptation not to report a finding
would be very great if the finder was aware that by doing so, he
might lose his rights in the property found. The Rofrano decision
should have the effect of encouraging honesty among finders.
JOHN W. JOHNSON
EFFECT OF HOLD OVER PROVISIONS
ON VACANCIES IN OFFICE
In many jurisdictions, the incumbent in an elective public office
is authorized to hold over after the expiration of the term, until his
successor is duly qualified. When the successor fails to qualify, the
question arises as to whether there is a vacancy in the office.
The question arose in State ex rel. Foughty v. Frzederzch.1 At the
"291 F.2d 848, 85o (2d Cir. 1961).
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 251-58.
"OFoster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W, 376 (1915); Foulke v.
New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (192o); Jackson v. Steinberg,
186 Ore. 129, 2oo P.2d 376 (1948); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39
S.E.2d 3o8 (1946). See Comment, 52 Harv. L. Rev. sio 5 (1939).
11o8 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1961).
CASE COMMENTS
i96o election, Heringer was elected a trial judge for a term to com-
mence on the first Monday in January, 1961. The incumbent, Judge
Benson, resigned before his term officially expired on January 2, 1961.
Afterwards, on December 23, 196o, Heringer died. The governor
appointed Friederich to fill the vacancy created by Judge Benson's
resignation. The succeeding governor declared that a vacancy existed
in the office because Judge-elect Heringer had failed to qualify, and
he appointed Foughty to fill the vacancy. When Friederich refused
to vacate the office upon request, Foughty filed an information in
quo warranto challenging Friederich's claim to said office.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the trial court's
denial of the writ, holding that the subsequent appointment of Fough-
ty was invalid. The court reasoned that a vacancy in office does not
result from the death of an elected official before the. beginning of
the new term where the term of the incumbent extends until a
successor has qualified.2 One judge dissented, taking the view that
the hold over provision was designed in the public interest to prevent
a vacancy in office and not to extend the tenure of an incumbent for
his own benefit.3
The prevailing rule, as illustrated by the majority opinion is
that the death of one elected to an office. before he has qualified does
not create a vacancy if the incumbent is authorized to hold over until
his successor shall have qualified. 4 Therefore, the office is not to be
deemed vacant so long as such office is filled by an incumbent who is
legally qualified to perform the duties which appertain to it.5
The majority approach draws a distinction between vacancy
created during the regular term and the expiration of a term of
office. In the latter case, the incumbent is under an obligation to con-
tinue in office to discharge the duties until his successor has quali-
fied, and this added period is a part of the rightful term of office6 And
accordingly, it is an established principle that a qualified successor
is one who has been chosen by the same mode as the regular incum-
'Id. at 682.
81d. at 694.
'Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 190 S.E. 794 (1937); Clark v. Wonnacott, 3o
Idaho 98, 162 Pac. 1o74 (1917); State ex rel. Freeman v. Carvey, 175 Iowa 344, 154
N.W 931 (1915); Smith v. Snell, 154 Kan. 197, 117 P.2d 567 (1941); Gnnnell v.
Bunker, 115 Me. io8, 98 AtI. 69 (1916); State ex rel. Boone County Atty. v. Willott,
1o3 Neb. 798, 174 N.W. 429 (1919); State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 8o Ohio St. 244,
88 N.E. 738 (19o9); State ex rel. Hellier v. Vincent, 2o S.D. 9o, 104 N.W 914 (9o95).
For cases of other jurisdictions see generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 486 (1931).
tPittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 19o S.E. 794 (1937).
"Shackelford v. West, 138 Ga. 159, 74 S.E. 1079 (1912).
1962]
254 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
bent, absent a statute to the contrary3 Thus, if there is no vacancy to
warrant an appointment, and there is no provision for a special elec-
tion, the incumbent is entitled to hold over for another term.
Some jurisdictions follow a minority rule, as illustrated in the
dissenting opinion of the principal case, under which the expiration
of a term of office is synonymous with vacancy, even though the in-
cumbent may hold over until his successor has qualified.8 Therefore,
the appointing power may fill the vacancy created by the expiration
of a term of office, if no one has been elected to the office or if the
official elected died prior to the beginning of his term.
The jurisdictions adhering to this approach generally emphasize
that the hold over provision is not "designed or intended to extend
the tenure of office by an incumbent for his own benefit beyond the
specified term.."9 In declaring that a vacancy exists upon the expira-
tion of a term of office, it is reasoned that a holdover provision is not
a limitation upon the appointing power to fill vacancies in the of-
fices. 10
Under this approach a vacancy in office does not hinge upon the
fact that there is an absence of a qualified person to administer the
office. :" The hold over provision is primarily aimed at preventing a
hiatus in the office rather than prolonging the tenure of the incum-
bent.'2
Another principle stressed by the jurisdictions following this mi-
nority approach is the construction of the state constitutions or the
applicable statutes. 1 3 The Kentucky constitution provides that Justices
of the Peace shall hold for three-year terms and "until their successors
are elected and qualified." 14 Nevertheless, Olmstead v. Augustus15
'Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 19o S.E. 794 (1937).
'State ex tel. Covington v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 So. 679 (i9o5); Adams
v. Doyle, 139 Cal. 678, 73 Pac. 582 (193o); Gibbs v. People ex Tel. Watts, 66 Colo.
414, 182 Pac. 894 ('919); People v. Pillman, 284 Ill. App. 287, 1 NXE.2d 788 (1936);
People ex tel. Mitchell v. Sohmer, 209 N.Y. 151, 102 N.E. 593 (1913); State ex tel.
Kenner v. Spears, 53 S.W. 247 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1899); Dobkins v. Reece, 17
S.W.2d 8i (rex. Civ. App. 1929); State ex rel. Finch v. Washburn, 17 Wis. 678
(1864). For cases of other jurisdictions see generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 486, 494
(193-1)
'State ex tel. Sathre v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W 558 (1935). This case
is distinguished in principal case but is not overruled.
1In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 65 Fla. 434, 62 So. 363 (913).
"Alcorn ex tel. Hendrick v. Keating, 120 Conn. 427, 181 At. 340 (1935).
22Campbell v. Dotson, iii Ky. 125, 63 S.W. 48o (igoi).
"State ex tel. Sikes v. Williams, 222 Mo. 268, 121 S.W 64 (19o9); People ex Tel.
Mitchell v. Sohmer, 29o N.Y. 151, 1o2 N.E. 593 (1913).
"Olmstead v. Augustus, 112 Ky. 365, 65 S.W 817, 818 (19o).
512 Ky. 365, 65 S.W 817 (190).
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held there was a vacancy upon the expiration of the incumbent's
term. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky felt construction of the
constitution should be based "not only on an isolated expressi . n, but
on the whole instrument, and the plain purpose of the framers of
the instrument must be effectuated."' 6 The court said the framers
of the constitution could not have intended for a person who was
elected for one term of office to hold for a second term simply because
his successor had died prior to qualifying. The prerequisite, as fol-
lowed by the majority jurisdictions, that the successor is to be se-
lected by the same mode as the incumbent has also been held not to be
entirely conclusive as requiring actual qualification of a successor.
Thus in State ex rel. Robert v. Murphy, 7 the Florida Supreme Court
said this is only one factor "to be considered with such others as
the law may present in forming a correct judgment as to the mean-
ing of that law, whether organic or statutory."' 8
In a comparison of the majority and minority approaches, several
distinguishing aspects are evident. The rationale in a majority of
jurisdictions is that the people should be entitled to select the suc-
cessors for elective offices.' 9 If it is determined that a vacancy exists
upon the expiration of the term of office, whenever the successor
has not qualified, these jurisdictions feel there would be numerous
occasions where the governor would be supplying such offices with
incumbents and depriving the electorate of their right as provided
under the state constitutions.20 Such jurisdictions reason then, that
allowing an incumbent to hold over for another term provides an
adequate solution. However, the minority approach provides a more
adequate protection for the electorate. It prevents an officer from
holding over for a term to which he has neither been elected nor
appointed.2i The electorate has a manifest right to select successors, 22
and if under the circumstances they are unable to do so, then all juris-
dictions provide some authority with the power of appointment. Allow-
ing an incumbent to hold over for another term seems an undesirable
result, which cannot be concealed by simply labeling the period of
holding over as part of the fixed term. An incumbent may manipulate
the election so as to secure the selection of a successor who would refuse
"Id. at 818.
1132 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705 (1893).
"State ex rel. Robert v. Murphy, 32 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705, 711 (1893).
19See State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 8o Ohio St. 244, 88 N.E. 738 (1909).
0Ibid.
'=Campbell v. Dotson, iii Ky. 125, 63 S.W 480 (19o).
"Ibid.
